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PREFACE.
--- 000---
My subject "Miunici - al Negligence" though a subdivision
of the law of nnici-al corporations is still too broad to
do justice to any phase of it in a yroduction of this char-
acter., I have only been able to discuss the general prin-
ci-ples of negligence; and oerely touch upon cartain concrete
phases which are most corimon, but nothing like comprehensive-
ness has beon attem.pted.
The souraes from which I have. obtained my material is
appended. The works on Public Corporat ions are limited to
Beach, Tiedeman and Dillon. WTromI Judge Dillon's admirable
work I have received most aid.
B. L.
CHAPTR 1.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION DEFI 1.
---000---
All.individuals and corporate liability ariscs either
from the common law or by virtue of statutes'. (1) In con-
sidering the subject of cal liability those sources
must be kept clear and distinct.. "When applied" Judge Dillo.n,
says, "not alone is this distinction established but as
practically .aplied ith4s tended to promote justine and
to secure individual rights".(2) Public c rporations are
divided into Municipal corpGorationis proper and quasi roxr-
ations. A Muticipal'corporation is defined by Dillon as "A
body politic and corporate constituted by the incorpaoration
of the inhabitants of a city, town or village for the purpose
of local government."- () It is corprorate chiefly to
regulate theinternal or local affairs of the city or town,
not for the public but local convenience and in this sense
not an agent of the state.(4)
Sec. 1. t Villhe ard Town. Here we must distin,-
g-ibuih between the vernacular and t er~torial or technical
meaning of town and ,vill1age. ,Some text writers and courts
(1) Polloclz on Torts. page 2i.
(2) Dllon on IMicipal Corporations 7 5.
( •) Mcrawetz on. Corporatilons 5.
(4) arallton Coumty v Nighels, 7 Ohio St. 10
2have used tlte terms in but one sensc, while the term is
relative depending upon the territory wherein it is app1ied.(1)
In the Now England states towns aro not territorial divisions,
but unincorporatod settloments,- good extiplos of pure demc-
racy. Their powers and liabilities are liit)d and for all
purposes quasi corp orations. In New York towns are
political divisions of the county. In Delaware, .aryLand,
New Jersey and other states the term town is used indiscrim-
inately with village.K5)
See, 2. ograt ions. A quasi corporaion may
be defined as a branch of the state, possessing some corpor-
ate faculties and attributos only granted to aid in performing
publIc dity. (4) Such are the scho1l districts, counties,
towns in Now York, overseers of the poor and the Now- ngland
towns.(5) Some quasi corporations are mado municipal aor -
porations by statute and are.liable to the sa.e extent as,the
District of Colmzbia. In New York by the Laws of 1892 all
quasi corporations are made municipal cori. orations for the
purpose of suing and being sued. ) Bearing these dis-
tinctions in mind we can purnsue our discussion of municipal
(1)Am En. Eric. of Law Vol. 15, 953.
(2) Dillon on m Cor. -5o3.
($) Enfield v Jordan, 119 U.S. 33;ill v Boston,122 Lass.122
(4) Dillon on !Mun. Cor. 323.
(5) Chap. g87 Laws 1892.N.
liability.
Sec. 5. Liability. According to the linos of decis-
ions.the quasi corporations( including the New England towns)
are never liable-to individitals for injuries received through
its agents negligence, uinless such liability is irmposed upon
it by statute. They0 are political divisions of --.he state
and not subject to liability.(l) Thus a county is not lia-
ble for neglect. to repair public roads, to keep in repair
public buildings etc. There is no reason why this distin-
ction should be made between the liability of a city and a
eounty7 and An agent of the Common Council and an agent of
Board of Supervisors. A county has certain local privileges
and .advantages as well as cities, In lieu of these priv-
-ileges given by the state they should be held to strict in-
tegrity and diligence as a consideration for such grant, this
will in no way interfere with the imnunities of state agen-
cies, but such distinction is well established in most
court s. (2)
In New York actions to recover damages resulting from
injuries caused by defects in thu public highway in the
cuties and towns are of comparatively modern origin. As
( I) Dillon on Mun. Cor. 'O3.
(2) Cleveland v I~ing, 132 U.S. 2905.
4late as the case of Garlinghbuse v Jacobs, 29 N.Y. 207 de-
cided in 13A)it was hold that the cormissioners of the town
nor the town itself was responsible for defects in the highway.
But in 1870, the Court of A receded from its position
and decided in favor of such actions.(l) The Legislature.in.
1881 came to the aid of the courts and by a special statute
(Laws 1881, Chap. 700) towns were imade liable for damages to
person and- property sustained by defects in the public high-
wayL,. , By the Act of 1892 before referred to the town is for
a122j purposes of suing and being sied a rinici al cor-oration.
A tow is thus liable eo instanti for negligence of its
cmmnssioners, but he is liable to the town on the jax ent
rendered'tagainst the town. This liability is approaching
that of the mumicipal ,-o-rporation, as Judge O'Brien in
142 N.Y. 515 said, ." While in theory the town is not liable
except in cases where the commissioner was or would be liable
himself yet it cannot be doubted that te practical working
of- the statute has been to enable parties in some cases to
recover verdicts against the town where none would have been
rendered against the conmmissioner personally on the same facts.
( I) Hover v Barkoff', 44 N.Y. ll$.
( ) Robinson v Fowler, 0 Supr. 25; Albrecht v Queens County
84 Hun 401;, People v Pople, 81 Ilun °3",S; Dorn v Oyster
Bay, 84 Hun 510: People v Slater SI Supp. 752.
5CIAPTER II.
GROU IDS OF LIABILITY.
G---O0---_
Sec. 1. Theory of Liability. A municipal corporation
proper is liable for its negligonce as a privato corparation-
This liability does not rest upon statute, but implied from
the duty or duties intposed urpon it by its charter. (1) "The
4i grant of a corporate franchlse to a municipal corporation ,
says Judge Co011 ., "is usually made only at the request of
the citizens to be incorporated and it is justly assumed that
it confers what is to them a valuable privalego. This priv-
alege is a consideration for the duties which the charter
imposes, larger powers are given than are confided to towns
or counties, special authority is conferred to make use of
the public highways for the special and peculiar convenience
of the citizens of the municipality in various nodes per-
missible elsewhere." In this resect these corporations
are looked upon as occupying the same position as private
corporations which have accepted valuable franchises. To
bind the city or village it must be clothud w.ith sufficient
power by its charter to that end and its responsibility m
(I) Dill on Mun. Car. 930
6be limited by its creation for its existen~co is statutory aid
based poi ax agreemert ,botxen' th soverei.U power of the
state aid the eorporalox by whiclh tei former cofers val-
uable fraihises aid pojters aId the latter beeoues boXAd ta
eertairn aorrezpcxdi*ng Ed" iios.
See. 2. General Rule. Wpon the thoory of udertatLAg
duties aid assmig the powers of a private eorpoor~iox
before alluded to, a runicipal corporatiax is liable for its
(I) misfea9aice, positively iaj-rious to idividuals doxe by
muxtiipal agemts ix the course of their ploymert or per-
formaxee of eorporate dutcos,(2) for its xox-feazaee or o-
missiox to, perform air. absolute mixisterial duty; (3) or for
the proper performance of its corporate acd lomal duty ex-
press or implied.(2) With the last twp, liabilities oily
will we deal.
See. . _Limiinx liabil . The sources of sueb. lia-
bility beixg the charter and- thus statu-tory it may be limited
by charter or statute and it woLLld also. follow that its lia-
bility may be exiarged. This is the ease ix n y cities of
Wew York State. Same cities exempt themselves from lia-
(1) C aix v Syracuse, O liux (305.
Meet v 3roekport, 16 N. Y. 1I3I.
(2) Worri!l ox City Neg.3l
Thormp sox ox i egl i e c 732.
Pr
bility as Brooklyx for its egligemce but the, rsedy if axy,
is only available agaixst The of:ieers individually. Al-
thugh this act was held coxstitutioial the latter eases held,
"unless the duty has beex plainly devolvod upox sxlon offieezz
of the city against whomz a remedy oax be had the remedy miust
be agaixst the eity.(l) Biighamtn' s eharter is the same as
Brooklyx's harter on this point axd the lattor eates are
followed, also the eharter of .Ogdexsburg. Thu charter ean
defixe the xegligence axd limit the- negligenee of iinieipal
eorporations, it can require presemtmext of elais before
suit ad within a time limitod.t(2) A eity cannot relieve
itself from liability for its negligenee ix the eare of
streets by irinosig the sae duty rxpon the owxers of the
adjavext lots. The abutttiag owmers are not prm arily ax-
swerable for care of the. highways.(S)
A eharter provision reqrtirtxg lot awers to, keep their
sidewalks ix repair does not raise the presimption that the
lot owners have done their duty so as to free the ity.0(4)
Servie of notice by the tIty t o raae repairs does not re-
lieve fo r result ing inmjur ies. But in all eases of such
(1) ?itzpatriltk v Sloeim, SO N.Y. 338.
F it zger ald v B i gham on, 40 Hu 322.
( •) Van Vr'ake= v Schenect ady, 1 Hun 510.
Gray v Brooklyn, 50 B~arb. 165.
(3) Niven v Rochester, 70 N.Y. 619.
8liability the ut iato 1iahii tJy ,f on 1 author or the
maintainer of the nuisance and a suit lies against him. If
defendant fail to keep his hateh door in proper repair and
safe condition he is liable to a person injured, and it being
the duty of the city to keep its streets and sidewalks in
repair it could also be held liable. The parties are
analogous to joint tort feasqas and an action lies against
either or both.(5)
A city vcarter may require all legal remedies to be,
brought against tho owner of the land causing the dfect
in the first instant, (but such act is strictly construed.(l)
A elty in not held to the highest degree of care, of insuring
the safety of the streets, so it may happen that while a
suit does not lie against the city for its broach of duty,
it may against the individual, and a suit unsatisfied against
one is not a bar to a suit against the other.(2) The
municipality and the property ownor are not in pa delieto
or joint tort feasors to bar indemnity or an action over.()
See. 4 . Licenses. In case.the obstruction was caused
under a license, the righ t of recovery over depends upon the
(1) Raymond v Sheboygen, 70 Wis. 313.
(2) Severn v Eddy, 511. 18.
( ) Livingstone v Bishop, I Johnson R. 290.
Chitty Pleading 86-37.
(4) Lowell v Boston R.R. 23 Pick. 24.
Blinsee's eontraet, ex-pres or ImT)11ed, to Verforn the act
prMitted.,.An such a manner as nto protect the 1publie from
danger and and .the city from an aetion against it.(1) But a
Wrongdoer causint an imsafe streot without contract or license
is liable to reeover over upon the principle that he is a
gtsrantor of the safety of the street, Notice of suit
brought and o1pportunity to defend, to the person causing the
injury by the eOrporation intending to hold him. If the
owner had express notice of such l dency and could have de-
fended., he has boen held to be concluded as to. the existence
of the defeet as to the eorporation and as to the daages it
oeeasiones.(2) But the courts hold seuh judgment after
notice only prima faeie 'evidenee of 'the validity of the'. laim
thereby established.(5) The oizsion to give notice doe~s
not go to the right of the action, but simply changes the
burden of proof.(4)
See. 5. Neglirenee. A municipal corporation is not
an insurer against every accident upon its streets, nor is
eve.y defet actionable. But h erte as i1personal liability
the munieipality mrnst be under- a ditty and for the. negligent
iI ) Port Jervis v BalI, 9G 1I.Y. g50.
(2). Tray v R.R. 47 N.Y. 47g.
(3) Bridgeport v Wilson, 4 W.Y, 275.
(4) Aberdeen v Blac1k, G H-ill $24.
lQ
exereise of that duty it is liable (I) and whether that is
done or not is a practical question of fact to be determined
on trial in each casu.. So also it is essential to liability
that the plaintiff should have used reasonable or ordinary
care to avoid the accident as negligence on his part would
prevent recovery.
Reasonable care is always the test, and whether the
streets or pblie property was in safe oondition is a ques-
tion for the Jury.(2) In construbting sewers, drains,
grading roads etc. ,-a runici-pal cor-paration is bound to ex-;
I,
ereise that care and prudence, which a discrete and cautious
person would use if the loss or risk were his own.(3 The
degree of care and foresight which it is necessary to use
must always be in proportion to the nattre and magnitue of
the injury that will be likely to result, the care in a eity
being greater than that required in a village:.
(2) iluston v U.Y. 9 N.Y. 1G3.
SEvans v Wtiea, 60 N.Y. 163.
Todd v Troy, 61 N.Y. 503.
(3) Rochester C. v Rochester, 3 N.Y. 463.
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CHAPTER III.
WIMIN NOT LIABLE
--- 000---
Sec. 1. No General Rule. Where the duty is imposed
by statute, the liability rust be within the purpose and in-
tent of the statute.(l) But in the absence of statutory
liability as we have seen, the nuicipal ea*poration is liable
only in certain adjudicated circumstances. What these are is
difficult to determine, hr. Ju8stice Foote has said, "all that
can be done with safety is, determine each ease as it atises:
(2) We will first consider when a mnilcipal earrporation is
not liable for its neglitence.
See. 2. Public and PrivateDi0Ues. A, m, icipal
corporation is not liable for omission or emtission of any
act ocetring while in the perforrance of a political duty
laid by the state for the public benefit as distinct from
local or corporate advantages.(3) The -power here is in-
trusted to it as one of the political divisions of the state
and is conferred, not for the immediate benefit of the raunic-
ipality, but as a means to the exercise o-f the s~versgn er
(I) Lodv N.Y. 5 N.Y. 369.
Radcliffov Mayor, 4 N.Y. 195.
(2) Dillon, 006. H[ill v Boston, 122 Zass. 34.
(3) Loydl v N.Y. supra.
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for the benefit of all its citizens, thie corporation is not
liable for non-user nor for misuser by the public agents.(1)
"The coTrporation of the city of Now York possesses -two kinds
of power, one of governmental and public .and to tShe extent
they- are. hold and exercised is clothed with sovereignty; the
other, private and to. the extent they are held and exercised
is a legal individual. In the former the corporation cannot
be held, in the latter the duty is clearly niniste-rial and
falls under private powers" (2) But where the liability is
fixed by statute the rule cannot ap-Oly, a statute may give an
action against the state or any of its administrative agencies.
In the Now England towns no such distinction is necessary, all
departments of state being public and for the common benefit,
no action lies, in absence of statute.against them.(3)
Sec. 3. Quasi D e and Liabilities. It is in this
connection that the courts distinguish between quasi and mun-
iclpal corporations.. Quasi coriporations, mere political
divisions of the state having lowere and duties common to. the
public are not liable to individuals in the absence of stat4 ,
for' the breach of such dut ies.(.4 ) WhTen the ~mnicipal cor-
(I) Radcliff v Mayor, 4 N.Y. 195.
2) M[aximilan v Mayor, 62 N.Y. 164.
( ) Mower v Leicester, 9 1Mass.247.
(4) Ency. of Lar Vol. 14. page l143.
Lorillard v onroe, 11 N.Y. 392.
is
'poration exereises such functions as a political duty to the
public, or through off icers appointed by the state, they are
not liable for such negligence in perfoaring their obligations.
"There is a diversity of pinion' says J. Dillon, "as to when
duties are corporate and when the off iezs,though appointed
by the corporation are to be regarded as the officers of
'I
the imncilOa!ity and not of the state or public generally.(1)
See. 4. Quasi Officers. Not every officer of a mm-fl
icipal corporation, though appointed and removed by it, is
its agent within respondeat superior, nor officers elected
directly by the people or appointed by the legislature, even
if the city is obliged to pay their salaries.(2) If the
officer- or his subordinate is appointed to p rform a public
duty, and not one undorta.en by the rnaicipal itywhether
Appointed by the state or city, then he is a public or quasi
and not a municipal officer. Such officor cannot be regarded
as an agent of the city for whose negligence or want of skill
it can be held liab" .5-
In order to clothe an officer as a nicipal servant, he
must be; engaged in a local, private duty, appointed by and
('1) Dillon, 96G..
(2) Shearman and Redfieild on Negligence, .,S2.
(5) Baily v 1N.Y. i Hill 531.
Fisher v Boston, 104 Mass. 87.
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Paid by the municipality in such capacity and have control
and power to remove him. It is only in these capfeitieg
that the city is liable for negwigence of its agents and
their acts. Only when it is within their scope of official
duties and as before staed, a private andnot ap public
fumct ion. The rule respondoat superior, must be applied
within the bounds of mnmicipal as distinguiAshed from quasi
corporate functidn.
Police officers and police departments of a city are not
its agents, so as to render the corporation responsible for
neglect f duties to individuals, unless exprossly provided
by statute.(l) Neither is a city liable for negligence of
its firemen and fire de-partment appointed and paid by it;
their duties are for the publioc and not for the corporate
interests.(2) The same principlerapplies to city boards,
of public charity; of hospitals; of health; of poor.(3) Or
any dis.inct city board provided by state o-islature as,
Board of Revision,( assessment) water commnissioners, depart-
ment of public int1u.ctLon or public works in the City of Now
( I) )Meritto v Baltim~ore, 9 1 d. l5O; 'Phila. v Calvers~on, 71
Pa. St. 140 I~nz v Trot, 3Gi hun 315.
(2) 01'Iora v Mayor, I Daly 425; S~nith v Ro chester, C N.Y.513;
( ) Maximilian v iayor, 62 N.Y. 160; Conrad v Ithaca, 16 N.Y.
150
15
Yor.(I )
But the city is liable f&r t he negligence of engineers,
boards of health, vark.co-missioners, executive boards, water
boards etc., when it has the appointment and supervision,
and when the duty is for the local or direct benefit of the
CO*Poration and not ultra vires.(2) This liabillty is
based upon the right which the employer has to elect his ser-
vants, to direct and control them,, and to discharge them if
not toetoer 5 )
Sec. 0. Contractors. The principle of respondeat
smeriar as a rule oxtend to aases of independent contractors,
Vere the principaL has no control in.the manner and method
of perforaiing the contract. But this rule is modified in
its application to mTniciial contracts. A municipal cor-
poration cannot in any guise throw off its imposed duties by
contracting work on its streets, and this is tr-ae although.
the contractcr is indcpendent, for all other Tirpases. It is
immaterial as respect's primary liability whether it has or
has not inserted such a disavowal of liability in its contract.(4)
(1) Russel v New Yorik, 2 Denia 461: Ehrogot v N.Y. 036 N.Y.2O64( ) Nrr il, 96.;: Thorny V N.Y. 13 H tun 207.(3) Kelly v 1I.Y. 11 U .Y. 432.
(4) Sto rs v Utive 17 N.Y. 104; 'Har~ington v Lansingbur~gh,
110 )I.Y. 14 . Trusso v Bu~ffalo, 4 .Y. 67.
The New"York cases bep, inning with Blake v Ferris, 5 N.Y.
48 decided in 1837, fol1owed by Pack v Mayor 8 N.Y.52, that
where the city oaffierg n rinto~d the work, it does not
necessarily 1a the city liable if the contractor is other-
wise independent. In Ztorrs v Utica, 17 N.Y. 104, followed
in many courts, the doctrine is, that where the acoident was
the result of the work itself in the actual porforiance of
the very wor contracto f r the corporation still remains
liable. As stated by J. Dillon "respandeat superior does
apply where the contract directly requires the dperformance of
a work intrinsically dangerous however s}-ilfully performed. °
In such a case the party authorizing the work C city) is just-
ly regarded as the author of tio uischiof • resulting from it
whether he does the work hilself or lets it out by contract.
Where the obstruction or defect is purely collateral to
the work contracted to be done and is entirely the wrongful
act, of the contractor or his warkmen, the rule is that the
city is not liable." But where the injury results directly
from the acts which the contractor asrees and is authorized to
do the city it equaliy liable.CI) Uhore the ' rorL is o
itself a nuisance or is necessarily dangerous the corporation
is bound not only to require the contractor to take every
I) Robins v Chicago 4 iJail. 679.;
Mc lhaffrty* v The Laften Co. 61 N.Y.l7(3
17
reasonable and proper j-rocaution to prevent any mischief en-
sixing, but to soe that such precautions are taken by the con--
tractor. Excavations contracted to bo finished,-.it was
hel that the city ,Vas liable for inj4ry to the plaintiff be-
cause the excavations wore needlessly- and no lirently suffor-
ed to be in the street for an _-reasonable length of tirle,
and for that, responsibility attached to the city.(I)
SeU. 3. Liconroo>. consent of a .u0Wm iealin pur-
suance of it1 authority to a citizen. to excavato or obstruct
a -public street does not na1.e it repansible for the wrong-
ful or negligent manner in which the licensee and his employ-
ees do the work. (2) The licensee is aienable to individ-
uals who may have -rfforod from their negligence or by reason
of misauer of the license.(3) If the grant of license in
excess of the corporate and'injury resulted from it the cor-
poration will not be protected,(4) but not where the grant is
in good faith and a ;Jre 1iscon trA..ion or its powers. The
licenosee.s of a T.mnicipal corporation pernittcd to exercise
any indepencent tracie or business for their own -rofit are
not the agents of the corporation, s o as to >iall.e it impliedly
(1) Shearnaan & Reifiolci, 293.
(2) Fogel v N. Y. 02 I .Y. 19.(Z) Port :,Jervis v nari, 9 T Y 5 SormC _cil,2b
(4) People v Brooklyn, ,3C5 lIT.Y 349";Parton v Syracu-se, 30 MY ..
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liable on the orinciple of r sond'at sujerior.(l)
Thevo rules are subject to the general liability of the
city, to ,le-,; its stro..(ts in 4.afC a-, A kro-%or -o1ndition and.
the corT>ort ion i thhist h id for injitriez caused by odstruct-
tons or Oxcavations roate2 oy thu ir liccmss, in all grants
of priviloe to ititerfre with the dity owerd to the Ublic,
it is neverle!s boind to exercise a FrviSi.n ofi t'1o work
so as to -revenrt con ta  injuirier ,2) or a private indi-
idealn to lay pipes from tho ia.-n to their houoss the city
must -provide all rneans to revenk consequential injuries.
Spe[aing generally a city in not liable for the acts of
nersons acting with license, except after due notice ta charge
the city, under general liability to ke:i- streets in safe
condition for travel.(3)
(1) Dillon, 953. /
(2) Shearman & Redficl'd, 353; Storrs v Utica, 17 IT.Y. I .
( ) Thuton v iN. Y. '3 Sandord o34 .ai~l jtyae,3
Alb. Law' Journal 110;, Griffin v N.Y. 3 IT:.Y. 4& .
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CIhAPTER IV.
DISCRETIONARY POWERS.
1ec. . What is a Discretona F owne. A iaulmicipal
corporation is not irm2liedly liable in an action for damages
either for the non-exercise of, the rotive or mariner in which,
in good faith it exercises itAQlegislative or judicial powr.(,l)
In the negligent*or non-exercise of such discretion they.are
not liable.(M) It is not liable for its failure to provide
for the removal of a nuisance,() or to exercise its power to
sup-ply water and a.,aratur for extinguishing fires,(4) or for
injuries to s-upply suitable drains and sewers or any drain
or sewer at all..
W ere the duty alleged to have been violated is purely a
judicial one, no act ion lies in any case for misconduct, how-
ever gross in the erformance of them. Although the officer
acts corruptlM and anscwerable criminally, h ay not be liable
aivillyl A city has .,ower to open streets a,- for dding so,
is not liable even if it discoimodes a jzropoerty owner,.(O)
The need of' drains, sewers, culverts, walls, paving, grading
(1) Dillon, 9*a; Roch-estr Io. v R: hes~or 5? N .Y. 4,37.
(i?) Cain v Syracuse, 95 Nr.Y. 31. Dillon, 957,977.
(5) Carr v Northern Liberties, 78 Am . Lc. 344.
(4) Smith v Rochester, 73 NJ.Y. 503.
etc. is a discretionary rower of the legislature of the city
and no action can be sustained, for the raannrier of' jlan orCtie)
time of continuing it.(l)
B".t Judge Taylor says (2) "these duties so mingle as not
to be easily distinguishod from each other. Ministerial
duties rmust not be violated with ir"aunity although im-posed
upon a judicial offlcer. Thusz a -power may be given to build
sewers whether they shall be constructed, and what places,
and to what extent, is discretionary with local legislation,
while the duty if the work is undertaken, of proper care and
afterwards, of necessary rqpjir bocozmesan absolute duty.(3)I i ,I s ' ' % i t . . ;
See, 2. Ordinn nces Failure to enforce ordinances or
by-laws without notice--- A city is not impliedly bound to
secure a erfect execution and regulation of its by-laws and
It is not such negligence as to. render the city liable for
te manner in which, the ordinances are executed, any more
than the ntate would be liable for any imperfection in carrying
oitt its administrative duties. An injury resulting from the
want of regulations, or ordinances; or from an unreasonable or
egligent application of existing remedies, can have no re-
(2) Cain v Syracuse, 95 "T. Y. 91.
(3) Wison 'V Mayor, I Denia -95; ,'Cills v Brooklyn, supra.
dress from the city. "The contrary doctriner says Judge
Denio, "would oblio its treasurer to r1i-1he good to every eit-
izen any loss which they rtight sustain for want of adequate
laws. tt i)'
Thus, it was held that failuzre to ,'ass or execute certain
police ordinancer; to prohibit swine from running at large;
or to establish stroot grad'es; to mrair:tain a required number
of men in certain departrlentasdr to tak.e required bonds from
auctioneers, will not rendero the corporation amenable to an
action.(2) Though not actionable, these cases may bind the
corporation by continuous disregard of the needs of the city
and after noti c.C'3)
see. 3. Plans and Method. For a mistake, defect or
error in the plans of constructing or repairing drains, sewers,
roads etc. the corporation is not repon.ible.(4} But the
exercise of a :judicial or a discrotionary power by a munici-
al corporation which results in a direct and phymical injury
to thee property of an indi'vidual, and which from itz nature
is liable to. be repeated and continued, ad is reiedial by
prudential measures renders the corporation liable for such
(1 ) Levy v N.Y. 1 Sands. 465. Forocyth v Ailanta, 12 An. R.g76.
(2) Th~ompson on 1~ogligenco, '732 note 231 .n v I.Y. 47 N.Y. 639.
( ) Mc Gintyvv N .Y. 5 Ttor §57.
(4) Johnson v D, of C. 118 Ig.S. 21liiller. v Broo1klyni,5 N.Y.483
2d aes as ccur in consequience of such continuance, of the
or iginal cause after notice and an omission to adopt such
remedial measurcs as ox erience x- shown to be .ecessary and
proper.(l)
Tkis distinction is firmly establisked in the New York
courts.(2) Thompson says, ) Te distinction is repugnant to
justiae and destitute of solid foundaton in reason.43) This
rule would guardj public infringements of -rivate property."
%It paactically prohibits taking -rivate proaperty fdr, public
use. As private corporations, cannot work an injury to, the
citizens without compensation any more than individuals, so
-public co rporations cannot.( 4)
Sec. 4. Ultra Vire"s At.. A corporat ion is not liable
for acts of .persons, color officio, acting beyond their
authority. So where an injury results from an act wholly
beyond the powers conferred upon a municipal cor0oration; the
latter cannot be held respronsible in daniages for the doing
Of it. We kate previously stated tbmat a city is only liable
for imposed, express or necessarily imi, lied duties, and not
those wiich are ultra vires.C5)
(1) Woods Law of Nuisance, 752.Siefert v lBrooi~lyn, 101 N.Y.142
(2) Lynch v - Vayor, 70 N .Y. GO-, atson v Kingston, 43 hun SG7.( ) Lansing v Farlan, . 7 i"& A. 152
(4) 1einfl v. Peorila, 41 IIi. 502.
(5) Thompson on Negligence 737 Dillion, 9Ga-Ocg.
Cnyler v Rochester, 12 W7endell 105.
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Such want of power must be presumed to be known to all
oofncerned, for ti is the ~riose of liriiting tie charter
Powers.l) The acts of the agents may be ultra vires and
void and no liability attac:os to tho prncipal.(2) The
COrp oration is not estopV'od to set up the nullity of its
agent's prooeedings, the officer himself nay remain liable.(3)
The general rule is inquestionably settled but the a.-plioation
is best met by the ciraiznstances in each case. Some courts
are seezIngly in conflict but they may be reconciled by the
differences in their charters and tke extent of tkei i mplied
powers.( 4)
But an exception exists in pleading ultora vires in keep-
ing t~e streets in safe condition. It originated with the
New York Court of Appeals and is followzed in many othier courts,
To amly the ultra vires defense to keeping streets in safe
condition would make all sorts of nuisances tolerable.(5)
Tkis superior duty to its streets, aheas the po ssible immun-
ity from all legal obstructions.(G)
(I) toltmacher v St Louis, 5 o. Ap 9. 23;PekIn v Newell,
26 111. 2?O
(2)Boorii v Utice 2 Barb. 10..
(5) l~oag v Vanderberg, C Ind. 511;Smith v Ro& eter,76 1N.Y.SO3
(4) Stanley v Davenport, 54 Iowa 463.
(5) Nayor y Cunli:Vf,2 Ni.Y. 165; Cohen v m[ayor, 113 N.Y. 52.
(8) oam v Ut ica, su~ra.
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See. 5. LiMiting Liabit. As tae city derives its
existence and power by virtue of its c1-artercan the city
limit its liability for negligence thoroin ? As to the for-
mer there can be no question, but can tke city contract away
all its liability ? T10 corporation can place any reasonable
restriction upon its citizens as a condition precedent to an
action, as to bring actian within certain time,;Aotice to be
filie, or other formality may be imposed. But these are
strictly construed and may not apjly to actions ex delicta.
A serious question arose under the Bwooklyn calrter
which read, I"he city of Drooklyn shall not be liable in
damages for any misfeasance or no nfeasance of the officers...
..but the remedy shall be against the officers -jersonally
if at all.1( l) J. Barnard in Gray v Brooklyn (2) in deciding
that this charter provision was constitutional, said "Te
city exists only by force of tke law creating it, this law is
sibject by the constitution to alteration and repeal. I am
enable to see why the same legislature may not create a city
and limit its liability." But a remedy mast be available
against the city and if not against its officers. The pri-
mary duty to L-eep.  its streets in repair, rests upon the city
and unless that d~ty is plainly devolved upon some officer or
() larrigan v Brook:lyn, 110 N.Y. 153.slnt v Oswego, 107 I.Y.
629. Laws of la75, C . 27.
()50 Barb. ,5s
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officers of the city, against whom an action can be kad, the
remedy is against t1e city.Ci ) This and subsequent cases
limit any shiffting liability to such casos, w~xere tho duty is
clearly thrown upon some officer or officers, But wkere the
old y
absolute duty rests .a uon tho o rration, it can be ri-
marily leld imnder tho strongest limitations, (2) a contrary
conclusion would sive Lnicivpal corrporations a great stretch
of "power.
(1.) Fitzp atrick v Slocu, 89 N.Y. 3654:
(2) hardy v Brooklyn, 90 HE y. 435 .
Vincent v Brooklyn, Sl in 3. 22,51G
CH}APTJ!R V.
MINISTERIAL DUTIEIS.
-..0 0 ) - - -
Sece. I. D tinui-.hd fr D iscretiOnary - The
izosed duties whether express or iiu7: 1ied, when ,erfect dut-
jes, as dtstinguishcd from discretionary duties rmust be
earrned out with due care and diligence, and for negligence
in suck performahce is liable to the injured individualdl)
The ministerial dut ies of fmniaipal aor porations are various.
The classes whic give rise to most litigation arow out of
the exercise Of t Ve judicial and discretionary sawers in a
negligent anner, ma1ing public imp roverrent, repairs et.J-2)
in the improper -:ianagement and control of its property they
must not invade private ro cprty rights; and in thte control
of streets, bridges, walks, sewers etc.
Sec. 2. . __ .ro-T y owner. A municipal corporation
is in its -rivate capacity, as the owner or lessee of lands,
chattels etc. to be regarded in the same light and liable to
the some extent for its negligence as individuals are.(3) It
is not nece~ssary to allege title in the, city, for although it
has .legal itle but not ordinary control and enjoyment as
(I) Thompson on Negligence, 731;fDisbrow v iingston, lOz N.Y.219
Jenny v N.Y. 120 N.Y. 154.
(2) Thompson on Negligence, 73&.
owners it will not be reslonsible.(I) Public h ig1ways are
not to be considered rivate -wrorerty of1 the city strictly,
although diligent use and management is required;(2) sewers,
water pipos, gas ]aies and plant may be owned as private
1ro-erty by tke city.(3)
A corroration owning and receiving revenue for a publia
building or patt of it, althou& not liable for its use in a
-public eapacity, is liabvle the sme as a private landlord for
an injury to one, by reason of its neglect to Keep a amet-
ent janitor.(4) A farf supervised by a city, a market or
water plant owned by a city arc all subject to the same prin-
oiple.(5) A city cannot maintain- irnnigration sheds causing
.contageous to spread in the neighborhood; nor maintain a
water reservoir which percolates through the neighboring land;
nor neglect to Lecp its w iarves, dikes, and A9ipers in repair.(6
( 1) Terry v Mayor, 71 N.Y. 530.
(2) Robert v Sadler, 104 W.Y. 229.
(3) Detroit v Corey, .9 Lich. 105.
(4) Warden v Wow £edford, 151 MaSs.-
( ) Mayor v Cullon, 53 Ga. 34G.Romwland v Il amazeo,49 Mich.5
(6) Rading ,v Briggs,37 N.Y. 256. Baily v N.Y.3 lill 531.
Mgercy Dock Co. 11 H. of' L. 715;N orthern Co. v Chicago,
99 U.,S. 655.
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CNAPEER V1~
SEVERS.
See. I. Li abIity. A riuniclpal oerporatlon is ze.gard-
ed as the owner of ita sewers. It is liable to the persons
connected with the main sewer for any neglect to keep the
sewer, in repair;, or by so ,negligently constructing it as to
beeome a trespasser on private property.(l ) Although the
city is not liable for omitting to built a sewer or drain,
yet, having exereised its power tle duty is not discretionary
but becomes ministerial..
They are held liable l) where :the agents or servants
in constructing the sewer do the work negligently ar unskill-
fully whereby unnecessary damages happen to adjacent walls,
cellars dtc,(2) where the sewer is so constructed or main-
taired as to constitute a nuisance,(X) where the direct re-
sult of the manner in which the sewer is constructed, is the
flooding of a person's premises, it is thus liable far tres-
pass to the freehold, (4),where in digging a sewer it a pub-
lie street, a dangerous excavation is left open and unguarded,
whereby a traveller without fault on his part is injured.(2)
(1) Shearman & Redfileld, 287;
( 2) Thompson on Ne gligence, 750.
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in the latter case the liability may arise even if
done by an independent contractor, when it had notice of the
dangerous defect express or implied, so that the city ould
by reasonable diliponce have repaired or averted the defet.(1
Sec. 2. Degroo of Care. The duty devolves upon the
oorpo"ation to exercise a reasonable degree of care and
watchfulness in ascertaining the condition of the sewers,
from time to time, and prevent them from becoming delapidated
or obstructed; Thr onission to make such an exaanation and
to keep then clear is a neglect of duty which renders the
city liable.(2) Wlfnrre no negligence, either in plan or cn-
trol is alleged, the plaintiff cannot recover where the daz-
ages are caused by a want of judgment, Xot after extraor%
dilnary rains or the like from which the injury resulted.()
The plans, methods and location of sewers is a more
difficult question. This is generally a legislative pOwer-
a questionresting in the sound discretion of the City Ceun-
oil. The courts cannot review such decisions, thus a court
of equity cannot compel a city to constrict a new sewer, where
the existing one is of' insufficient Capacity to carry off the
(I) Fort v Dewitt, 47 Ind. 97. Darlon v Brooklyn, 46 Iarb.604.
(2) Mc Carty v Syracuse, 46 N.y. 194.
(3) Collind v ?hiladelphia, 13S Pa. St. 272. Smith v Liayor,
4 Hun 637. Barry v Lowell, 8 Allen 127.
sewage, (1) nor enjoin the construction of a sewer because of
the inadequacy of the size.,()
If a' public sewer beeomaes incapable of discharging the
voltfe of water for which Mt was designed, either by a change
of surface drainage in conseqtuence of the drainage of streets
or by the natural growth o9 the city, the cwrporation will
not be liable for damages by reason of not enlarging. it.e()
B=- there are nany leading cases, deciding, that the skill and
care, which is incumben , upon the city relates as well to the
capacity of the sewer when built as to the mere meOhanisi in
its construction; as well to its plans as to its execution.(4)
J. Coo]4 in Detroit v Beckman, limits such liability in
defective plans to a direct invasion of private property. A
municipal charter never could give authority ta appropriate
the freehold of a citizen without conmpensation, whether it be
done by an actual taking of it for streets or by flooding
it, so as to interfere with the owner's possession. The de-
cision rebukes the general theory as "so vicious that it
cannot possibly be omitted".1 5) Another exception to the
general ruzle is where the city is guilty of gross intrinsic
negligence in the plans and spe cifieations.(O)
Itl) 1Norton v Xayor,>4 Lea. 59 2 ) Thompson,752.
(U) Indianopilis V Huffer,30 Tnd.235; (4)Xim v ?ittsburg,40
Pa. St. 3G4.(5) Wood on Nuisan~ces, 752;seif'ert b Broklyn,
101 N.Y. 542.
CKAPTER VII.
SURFACE WATERS.
-- 000ooo---
Sec. I. Matural Streams. Cities having the power to
grade and repair their highways, must in such improvements
for the public discommode the property of the adjacent owners°
Such injuries usually from surface water, diverted by the
grade onto the lower proprietors land is daminum absque in-
juria. It is well settled that a city cannot construct an
insufficient bridge, culvert or any other obstruction ta in-
terfere with a natural stream. It must have the unabstructed
and. uncontaminated flow for the enjoyment of the contiguous
propert y owners. Cl)
Sec. 2. Surface _Drainae. A city like an individual
isA-not liable for consequential damages resulting from sur-
face water in grading and improving public streets, althouh
increased quantities is,% thereon. (2) The city must
provide for and dispose of, the s faace water which falls
iupon its streets, and in the discharge of that duty neither
the city or its agents can be proceded against for draiages
sustained bM an individual. We noted before tliat there is
(1) Gardner v Newburg, 2 Johnsons Ch. 152;
2) Goodale v Tuttle, 20 N.Y. 45cJ.Weis v i adison,75 Ind.24 l.
Radcliffe v Droolyn, 4 N.Y. 105.
Mo liability on tle part of' the city for oxmission to construct
drains, sewers or make im~provements. This is discretionary
arnd when undertaken good faith and diligence are required.(1)
Although the injured property owner has no remedy, gen-
erally, he can reaover for negligence in the plans themselves
in making imptovement. In determining the size of culverts
or the grade of highways, reasonable skill must be exercised
or an action lies for damcages to an injured individual, but
New York seems to deny such liability.(2) So where the
drainage is collected in a common channel and thrown upon or
carried over the land of a private owner, the injured owner
h~as a remedy. In grading a street, a city is liable if it
turns a stream of water upon the grounds and into the cellar
of one of its citizens. It. can relieve itself by improve-
ments, but, not by positively throwing the drainage upon
private land. 3) Such consequential damages are not taking
property for public se uunles* the constitution, as many con-
stitutions do, include such taking in their eminent domain.(4) '
The New York constitutional provision is not broad enough to
include such comp;ensat ion.
(I) Siefort v Brooklyn, 101 N.Y. 301.
(2) Van Pelt v Davenport, 42 Iowa 308; Rillon, 1041.
(3) Rice v Evansville, 103 IrA. 13.
(4) Dillon, 9o0 Foot v Brunson, 4 Lansing 47.
CHAPTER VIII.
HIGI4FAYS A.1I S IDLTWALLS.
--- OOC---
Sec. I. Rules of L iabiit-Y. micipalities have gen-
eral control of their streets whbther tlie fee be in them, as
owners or trustees or in the property owners. They must
make the necessary repairs and improvements, by grading,
draining, building sidowalAs and crossw.alks as the circumr-
stances and growth of the city may reqiiAre. The general rule
is that the cities are liable for damages caused to travel1r
from defective and unsafe streets under their control. In
repairing or constructing highvays the corporation is required
to use ordinary care and foresight, for a lack of which it is
liable in damages to the i.art1.y injured.(1) It is always the
duty of the city to keep the streets free from obstructions
and nuisances; sufficiently level and guarded by rails; or
lights when necessary to enable safe and convenient travel.(2)
Such protection extends upwards to awnings, signs and walls,
as well as the ground and sidewalk.(3) Highways and side-
walks im a populous city must be~ kept clear and unobstructed
in its full width; while in a town this my not be necessary,
(I) Htnue v W.Y. 47 N.Y. x339. Dillon on Xunicipal Corpor. p.SS9
(3) Hubbel v Yonkers, 104 N.Y. 434.
to such an extent.
This liability arises from the coMMronror "plied bY the
acceptance of the charter. But the Englih, Canadian and
New England do not apply such ir-plied liability.(l) SOMO
states as Wisconsin and 7itchigan, have statutes exefpttIng
their cities from their conazon law liability, no suit can be
brought against, such cities unless the liability is created
by statute.(2) Those courts reason,that the city in con-
trolling its streets does so in a governiental or .ublie cap-
acity, as a branch of the state, and should be exeipt froM
clvil litigation and only subject to penal pumisbment. Thls
arguLent is apprdved by Judge Dillon, but the iron-clad pre-
cedents hinders such inclinations of the courts in other jur-
isdict ions.
Sec. 2. Sidowalks. Sidewalks and street crossings are
comprehended in the torms streets and highways.T3) The duty
in respect to carriage ways, cross walks, sidcualks and
bridges is to maintain tha with reasonable safety for the
travelling public.(4) Ice and snow must be cleared with due
di3lIgence nuisances and obstructions L7ust be re~ioved, whether
(I) King v Broughton, S Dur. 210.
(2) Dillon on.Hun. Cor., 1000.
(5) Wilson v Watertown, 3 h un 508.
(4) Hines V Lookport, GO Darb. 378.
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on the grolud or ovcrhead; railings mst be attached when
necessary and all other -Precaution which prudence requires to
protect the travelling public.(l) A violation of a city
ordinance is not negligence per se between the parties.
Sac. S. Ice and Snow. The mere slipperiness of a
sidewali o ccasioned by ice or snow, not accunmlated so as to
constitute an ebstrnction is not ordinarily such a defect as
will make tio city liable for damages to one injured thereby.
But where the snow and ice exists upon a street in such shape
as to form an abstruction, being heaped up or having a raughi
suirface the city is liable.(2) This distinction is held by
many courts, but the Tew York courts have never made such a
fallacious distinction. it matters not whether the ice is
in ridges or smooth, the question is, does it form an ob-
struction. The municipal authrities are called upon. to
abserve and see that the lpublic streets are reasonably clear-
ed of snow and ice in winter. In such cases the law only
requires what is feasible and reasonable.
If from any artificial cause an existing nuisance, as .
spouting hydrants, adjacent leaders etc., the, ice is pri-
marily caused dr the danger increased the city is always
.... oore v Gadsen, 87Z 1I.Y. 34.
(') Ki~nney v Troy,. I08 .Y.5d7.
llable.l ) But the question of negligence in protecting
streets is one for the Jury- They must consider all the
facts and ciramustances and determine whether the city was
negligent. The contributory negligenae is always a good
defense on the part Of the Oity. In order to recover from
the city the plaintiff nust be free from any element in caus4
Ing the injuTy coplained of.
(1) Todd v Troy, 01 N.Y. 500.
Landolt v 1Norwich, Z7 Conn. 615.
BIBLI OGRAPIIY
Dillon's Launicipal Corporation, 4thl Ed. 1890.
BeTh's Pitbi1to Corporation, 133.
Murphy's J'nnicipal Corporation, 1801 (Pa.)
Peak's Municipal Corporation, 1892 (Ohio)
Richard'1Is Mu i cipal Corporation, 1390 (Pa.)
Tiedeman's Municipal Corporation, 1893.
Korril's City Negligence.
Ray's Iraposed Duties, 1394.
Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, Chapters 12-17.
TheMpson on Negligence, Vol. 2.
Wood's Law of lhisanees, 2nd Ed.
American and English Corporation Cases.
American and English Enay. of Law, Vols. 15, 24, 16.
Thomp son's Cornmmentaries on Corporation Law, 195.
